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We analyse the importance of educational mismatch between vacancies and unem-
ployment in the Dutch labour market. Using unemployment and vacancy data by
educational level, we estimate a matching function which incorporates the effect of
educational mismatch on the aggregate flow of filled vacancies. Using the estimated
parameters, we calculate how much of total unemployment can be attributed to
educational mismatch. The results indicate that educational mismatch is not an
important determinant of unemployment in the Netherlands. Moreover, it shows
a remarkable trend. Contrary to common belief, the relative importance of mismatch
appears to have strongly decreased since the end of the 1960s.
1. I N T R O D U C T I O N
Unemployment and vacancies coexist in the labour market.
One reason for this phenomenon, going back to Holt (1970),
is that matching vacancies and unemployed is a time-
consuming process, its efficiency being dependent on the
search behaviour of both employers and the unemployed
(or, more generally, job searchers). Another reason for the
coexistence of unemploytnent and vacancies, going back to
Hansen (1970), is thai the characteristics of the unemployed
differ from those of the jobs that are vacant. This latter
reason has become known as mismatch. Both the efficiency
of the matching process and mismatch may be important
determinants of the level of unemployment, given the num-
ber of vacancies.
This paper analyses the importance of educational mis-
match between vacancies and unemployment in the Dutch
labour market. As in many Western countries, the incidence
of unemployment is disproportionally high for lower-
educated workers in the Netherlands, while the vacancy rate
is generally lower in the lower-education segment of the
labour market. For example, in 1993 the unemployment
rate of lower-educated workers was more than twice as high
as the unemployment rate of higher-educated workers.
while the vacancy rate in the latter segment of the labour
market was more than three times higher than for lower-
educated workers. These data suggest that educational mis-
match is important, i.e. that unemployment can be reduced
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by shifting some of the unemployed from the high unem-
ployment-low vacancies segment to the low unemploy-
ment-high vacancies segment of the labour market.
In order to analyse the importance of educational mis-
match between vacancies and unemployment, we use an-
nual unemployment and vacancy data by educational level
over the period 1969-93. These data have only recently
become available. Adopting the model by Jackman and
Roper (1987), we estimate a matching function which incor-
porates the effect of educational mismatch on the aggregate
flow of filled job vacancies. Using the estimated parameters,
we calculate how mtich of total unemployment can be
attributed to educational mismatch for each year within the
considered period.
Our paper is connected with Gorter and van Ours {1994).
They study regional and occupationul mismatch in ihe
Dutch labour market by estimating a matching function
using regional vacancy and unemployment data by occupa-
tion over the period 1980 88. Regional mismatch appears to
be hardly present in the Dutch labour market, while the
indicator of occupational mismatch included in their regres-
sion shows up insignificantly. A serious problem with
analysing regional and occupational mismatch is that the
labour market cannot be easily separated by region and
occupation. Living in another region or having been cm-
ployed in a particular sector of the economy does not
preclude seeking a job elsewhere. The same criticism applies
to most studies on mismatch for other countries (see e.g. the
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papers in Padoa Shioppa, 1991). This problem does not
show up in analysing educational mismatch, because com-
petition between job seekers of different eductional level
appears to be absent in the Dutch labour market, at least for
the categories we distinguish in our analysis {see van Ours
and Ridder. 1995. for empirical evidence using the concept
of the matching function). We further deviate from earlier
studies by estimating a matching function which explicitly
incorporates the effect of mismatch, instead of adding
a more or less arbitrary mismatch-index to the matching
function.
The results of our analysis indicate that educational mis-
match is not an important determinant of the unemploy-
ment rate in the Netherlands. Educational mismatch only
accounts for five to ten per cent of total unemployment.
Moreover, it shows a remarkable trend: the relative import-
ance of mismatch appears to have strongly decreased since
the end of the 1960s. Hence, the huge rise in Dutch unem-
ployment since the end of the 1960s cannot be attributed to
increased mismatch between vacancies and unemployment.
These results stand in sharp contrast to popular belief
that increased mismatch has driven up Dutch unemploy-
ment. The alleged importance of educational mismatch is
commonly based on the fact that unemployment is much
higher among lower-educated workers than among higher-
educated workers. This, however, does not necessarily imply
that aggregate unemployment would be much lower if the
incidence of unemployment was more equally spread over
educational categories. One reason is that vacancy rates
may as well, and actually do differ between educational
levels. For example, if the vacancy rate among higher-
educated workers is low. shifting unemployed from the
lower-education segment to the higher-education segment
does not tremendously increase the aggregate number of
filled vacancies, and thus reduces unempioyment only to
a small extent. In the analysis below, we explicitly take this
into account by using the matching function approach.
Another reason is that the lower-educated workers consti-
tute only a small proportion of the total labour force.
During the past thirty years, the educational levels of the
labour force has increased substantially. This development
is reflected in a rapid decline in the share of lower-educated
workers in the total labour force (from about 30% in the
late 1960s to 10% in 1993). Hence, even if unemployment
among lower-educated workers could be reduced signifi-
cantly by eliminating mismatch, its effect on the aggregate
unemployment level is rather small.
Besides the rapid decline in the share of lower-educated
workers in ihe total labour force, the decrease in the amount
of unemployment that can be attributed to mismatch can be
explained by a progressive deterioration ofthe labour mar-
kel position of higher-educated workers. While unemploy-
ment among higher-educated workers was rare in the late
1960s (in fact, the unemployment rate among higher-
educated workers was close to zero), over 6% of higher-
educated workers were unemployed in the early 1990s.
Thus, joblessness has become a much more general phe-
nomenon during the past decades, i.e. the importance of
educational mismatch has decreased.
The paper is set up as follows. Section II gives a short
description ofthe model adopted from Jackman and Roper
(1987). Section III presents the estimation results of the
matching function and compares the results with earlier
research. To our best knowledge, only one earlier study
exists in which a matching function is estimated using
Dutch aggregate data over a fairly long time period (van
Ours. 1991). Probably due to lack of data, mismatch is
neglected in that paper. In Section III, we also present the
development ofthe relative importance of educational mis-
match for Dutch unemployment implied by the estimated
model. Section IV concludes.
II. THE M O D E L
In order to analyse mismatch in the Dutch labour market,
we follow Jackman and Roper (1987) by using the concept
ofthe matching function. The matching function describes
the relationship between the flow of tilled job vacancies in
a period (M) and the stocks of unemployed (V) and
vacancies (K) at the beginning of the period (see e.g.
Blanchard and Diamond. 1989, Jackman et ai, 1989; and
Pissarides, 1992). The location of the matching function (i.e.
the efliciency of the matching process) depends on the
search behaviour of both employers and job seekers. The
more effective employers and job seekers search for each
other (and thus the more they contact), or the higher the
probability that a contact results in a match, the higher is
the flow of matches given the stocks of unemployed and
vacancies. In a steady state labour market, in which match-
ings equal the equilibrium inflow into unemployment, an
increase in efliciency leads to lower unemployment and
lower vacancies.
To account for possible effects of educational mismatch
between unemployment and vacancies, the aggregate labour
market in our model consists of a number of completely
separable submarkets distinguished by educational level.
Job seekers belonging to submarket / cannot or do not
search in other submarkets of the labour market. Conse-
quently, a vacancy belonging to submarket / is never filled
by a job seeker belonging to another submarket. This as-
sumption may be seen as quite restrictive. However, van
Ours and Ridder (1995) show that competition between job
seekers of different educational levels is absent in the Dutch
labour market, at least for the categories we distinguish in
our analysis. Assuming a Cobb-Douglas specification with
constant returns to scale, the matching function for labour
market segment i reads:
(1)
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where k is an indicator of the efficiency of the labour market.
The efficiency parameter k is related to the search behaviour
of employers and unemployed, which in turn may depend
on the level of unemployment benefits relative to wages and
the share of long-term unemployed in total unemployment.
Higher benefit levels may reduce the search intensity of the
unemployed because the net income gain of finditig a job
reduces. Moreover, unemployed may become less willing to
accept a job at given wage if benefits are higher (see van den
Berg, 1990, for empirical evidence using Dutch microdata).
Both ways, less vacancies will be filled if unemployment
benefits are higher, The share of long-term unemployed may
have a negative effect on the number of filled vacancies if
employers stigmatize or if long-term unemployed become
discouraged. On the other hand, the benefit level in the
Netherlands is generally lower for long-term unemployed
than for short-term unemployed. A higher share of long-
term unemployed in total unemployment thus reduces the
average replacement ratio, leading to lower reservation
wages, and thus more filled vacancies. Hence, the effect of
the share of long-term unemployed on the number of
matches is theoretically ambiguous. Forced by lack of data
on filled vacancies by educational level, the efficiency para-
meter is assumed to be the same across segments of the
labour market, as is the parameter a. Thus, unlike the
number of vacancies and unemployed, the matching process
itself is assumed to be the same across submarkets (cf
Jackman and Roper, 1987, and van Ours and Ridder,
1995).' For the same reason, we ignore employed job
seekers, as is the case in most earlier theoretical and empiri-
cal research.^
The matching function on the aggregate level is found by
summing up the matching functions of all segments of the
labour market, which yields:
(2)
V.
Equation 2 shows that the aggregate number of matches
within period t is dependent on the stocks of aggregate
unemployment and vacancies, and the efficiency para-
meter k. Furthermore, the aggregate number of matches
is dependent on the distribution of unemployment and
vacancies over submarkets, as indicated by the last term of
Equation 2. The last term is equal to one if. for each
submarket i, the share of unemployed belonging to submar-
keti in aggregate unemployment (t/f/t/) is equal to the share
of vacancies belonging to submarket / in aggregate
vacancies (Vt/V). Stated diferently, the segmentation of
the labour market is neutral to the aggregate number of
matches if and only if the number of unemployed per va-
cancy [U/V) is equal across submarkets. This state of the
labour market, in which the labour market situation is
equally favourable (miserable) in each submarket, is called
perfect structural balance (Jackman and Roper, 1987). If the
labour market moves from perfect structural equihbrium,
the last term is smaller than one, and less vacancies will be
filled given the aggregate U/V-rdUo. Consequently, aggreg-
ate unemployment will be higher than in perfect structural
balance. Intuitively, if we assume two submarkets, and the
number of unemployed per vacancy is very high in one
segment while very low in the other, the number of filled
vacancies will be lower than in perfect structural balance
because the number of potential matches is low in both
markets. If we could shift some of the unemployed from the
high unemployment submarket to the high vacancy sub-
market. the aggregate number of matches would rise and
unemployment and vacancies would decrease.
The difference between actual unemployment (U) and
unemployment in perfect structural balance ((./Jean be seen
as an indicator of mismatch in the labour market (Jackman
and Roper, 1987). Given the aggregate equilibrium levels of
M and U/V, which are dependent on the equilibrium inflow
rate into unemployment respectively the wage formation
process and (unanticipated) demand shocks, in perfect struc-
tural balance we have M, = kVlVl'" = M and UJV, -
U/V. From this and Equation 2 it follows that the difference
between actual unemployment and perfect structural bal-
ance unemployment is equal to:
' i . V = mmV (3)
The mismatch indicator mm can be interpreted as the share
of total unemployment that can be attributed to mismatch.'^
Clearly, the importance of mismatch for the aggregate level
of unemployment depends on the distribution of both the
unemployed and vacancies over stibmarkets. Intuitively, if
both unemployment and the number of vacancies are high
in one submarket, and both are low in the other, shifting
unemployed from the first submarket to the latter does
not tremendously increase the number of filled vacancies.
'Lindeboom and van Ours (1993) examine whether the efficiency parameter k differs between groups using microdata over the period
1986-88. With respect to the educational level, it appears that a higher educational level is related to lower contact probabilities, but also
to a higher conditional match probability. Because k is the product of these two variables, the level of k does nol seem to differ much
between educational levels.
^Burgess (1993). Pissurides (1994) and van Ours (1995) being exceptions.
-^  A closely related, and better known indicator of mismatch (;Hm/(l - a)) has been proposed by Layard cf a/. (1991), which indicates by how
much unemployment would decline if mismatch was nonexistent, given the number of vacancies. Because we feel this latter assumption is
unrealistic, we prefer mm.
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Hence, a more equal spread of the incidence of unemploy-
ment over educational categories would not reduce unem-
ployment to a large extent. Moreover, from Equation 3 it is
clear that the influence of a submarket's developments on
the level of the mismatch indicator depends on the size of
the submarket. Thus, relatively high unemployment and
low vacancies in a rather small submarket (e.g. the market
for lower-educated workers in the early 1990s) leads to only
a moderately higher level of the mismatch indicator.
111. M I S M A T C H IN THE D U T C H LABOUR
M A R K E T
The matching function derived in the former section (Equa-
tion 2) has been estimated using annual unemployment and
vacancy data for four educational levels over the period
1969-93. The four educational levels refer to:
1. primary edtication;
2. extended primary and lower secondary education;
3. higher secondary education and lower vocational educa-
tion;
4. higher vocational and academic education.
These data have only recently become available. Unfortu-
nately, we lack data on the flow of filled vacancies by
educational level which would enable us to estimate
a matching function for each submarket. Data on the ag-
gregate flow of filled vacancies are from vacancy surveys
conducted by Statistics Netherlands (CBS) for the period
1989 93. For the period 1969 87 we calculate the aggreg-
ate flow of filled vacancies using stock data on vacancies
and estimates of average vacancy durations reported in
Hartog (1980) and van Ours (1991).-' More details and
sources of all data used in the analysis can be found in the
appendix.
According to the model presented above, mismatch be-
tween vacancies and unemployed relates to the difference
between the share of unemployed belonging to segment / in
aggregate unemployment tUJU] and the share of the
vacancies belonging to segment / in aggregate vacancies
(Ki/K) for each segment. Figure la to Id show these data for
the four educational levels. As is clear from this figure, the
share of unemployed and the share of vacancies accounted
for by a submarket are in recent years much closer to each
other than they were at the end of the 1960s. This appears to
be the case for each educational level. Stated differently, the
labour market situation in each submarket (Ui/V,) re-
sembles the aggregate labour market situation much closer
now than it did twenty-five years ago. Thus, a first look at
the data suggests that the relative importance of educational
mismatch has decreased in the last twenty-five years. This
contrasts common belief that increased mismatch, especially
educational mismatch, has been one of the causes of the
huge rise in Dutch unemployment.
In order to be more precise, we use the model presented in
the former section to estimate how much of total unemploy-
ment can be attributed to educational mismatch in each of
the years 1969-93. The empirical counterpart of Equation
2 is:
logm, ^ const j . , + oi\ogu, -i- (ilogv,
1= 1
(4)
where kj represents a set of variables which might affect
search behaviour of unemployed and employers, such as the
replacement rate and the share of long-term unemployed in
total unemployment (see Section II). Furthermore, we took
up a time trend to account for changes in search behaviour
related to unobserved variables. The error term (e) is as-
sumed to have the usual characteristics. The lower-case
letters of M, U, and V indicate that we have normalized
these variables with the size of the labour force (cf. van Ours,
1991). Note that we initially do not enforce constant returns
to scale, nor a unitary coefficient for the mismatch index.
Because of possible simultaneity, we estimated Eqtiation 2
using (nonlinear) two-stage least squares, treating the unem-
ployment rate, the vacancy rate and the share of long-term
unemployed as endogenous. Besides the exogenous and
lagged endogenous variables included in the model, as addi-
tional instruments were used the logs of the capacity utiliz-
ation, the tax wedge, consumer minus producer prices, the
size of the working-age population and the capita! stock.
The estimation results are presented in Table I.
The estimation results are quite satisfactory. The first
column presents the results of the unrestricted estimation.
The sum of the estimated valtics of a and (i is close to one,
indicating constant returns to scale. An F-test revealed that
the hypothesis of constant returns to scale cannot be re-
jected (F ^ 0.03). Hence, in the second estimation, we re-
stricted thesumof:)! and/i to be equal to one. The coefficient
for the mismatch index appears to be insignificantly differ-
ent from its theoretical value of one,^ and is set at unity in
the second estimation. The share of long-term unemployed
shows up insignificantly, and is dropped in the second
estimation. This result in not too surprising, since the sign of
this coefficient is theoretically ambiguous.
Column two presents the estimation results of the
restricted and most preferred specification. The results
are close to those obtained by van Ours (1991), which is.
*The latter data have been estimated using the method described in van Ours and Ridder (1991).
-^ This result does not change if we omit the dummy variable and the proportion of long-term unemployment as explanatory variables. The
hypothesis that the coefficient for the mismatch index is equal to one cannot be rejected at conventional levels (f = 0.75).
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Fig. t(a)-(d|. Share of unemployed ( )ivacancies{ )) in total unemployment (vacancies) of four educational levels
Table 1. Estimation results matching function
Unrestricted eslimalion Restricted estimation
Constant
log (replacement rate)
log (share of long-term unemployed)
Dummy 1977-93
1
li
cR^
Durbin-Watson statistic
Estimation period
2.84 (0.38)
- 1.77 (3.t9)
0.16(1.42)
-0.25(2.t6)
0.35 (1.88)
0.60 (5.45)
0.36 (0.18)
0.90
2.32
1969-93
6.77 (3.17)
- 2.25 (4.62)
—
-O. t2( ! .8 t )
0.40(14.87)
0.60 ( - )
—
0.89
1.63
1969 93
Note: Absolute (-values in parentheses. R^ corrected for degrees of freedom.
according to our best knowledge, the otily other study in 0.37. Conform to our results, he finds constant returns to
which a matching function is estimated using Dutch aggreg- scale. Constant returns to scale is also found in most studies
ate data over a fairly long time period.*" The estimated value using UK and US data (see Coles and Smith, 1996. and the
of a of 0.40 is close to the estimate obtained by van Ours of references cited therein). In contrast to van Ours, we do not
Ours' estimation period is 1961-87. The reason why our estimation period starts al 1969 instead of 1961 is that the unemployment
and vaciincy data by educational level are only available from 1969 onwards.
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Fig. 3. Unemployment attributed to educational mismatch as a per-
centage ofthe tabour force (1969-1993)
find a negative effect of the share of long-term unemployed/
while we find much stronger effects of the replacement rate
on the number of matchings. Further, we deviate from van
Ours" results with respect to the time trend variable. We
tried several time trend variables, from which one appeared
to be significant. The estimated coefficient implies that the
efficiency ofthe matching process has decreased since 1977.
In contrast, van Ours observes no shift in the matching
function over the period 1970-87. However, it should
be noted that the influence of the time trend variable
in our estimation is very small in comparison with the
influence of the replacement rate. A quick look at the
development ofthe efficiency parameter k as implied by the
estimated model reveals that the time trend variable hardly
affects the pattern of k.
Having estimated the parameters of Equation 2. we can
now calculate how much of total unempioyment can be
attributed to educational mismatch, for each year within the
considered period, according to the estimated model (see
Equation 3). Figure 2 shows how the mismatch parameter
mm implied by the estimated model developed during the
considered period. Educational mismatch appears to ex-
plain only 5-10% of total unemployment. Moreover, it
shows a remarkable trend. As already suggested by
Fig. I(a)-(d), the relative importance of educational mis-
match appears to have strongly decreased since the end of
the 1960s. Hence, in contrast to common belief, the huge rise
in the Dutch unemployment rate over the past 25 years
cannot be explained by increased educational mismatch
between unemployment and vacancies.^
Because the Dutch unemployment rate hugely increased
during the period under consideration (from approximately
1% at the end of the 1960s, to more than 11% in the
mid-1980s and 7% in the early 1990s), the absolute amount
of unemployment due to educational mismatch shows
a somewhat different pattern than the relative share
reported in Fig. 2. Following Equation 3. the amount of
unemployment that can be attributed to educa-
tional mismatch is equal to the mismatch indicator mm
times the unemployment rate u. The resulting data
are shown in Fig. 3. No clear trend can be detected in
these data. The huge rise in the aggregate unemploy-
ment rate makes that the absolute amount of unemploy-
ment due to educational mismatch has remained stable,
although the relative importance of educational mismatch
has strongly decreased. Note again that educational mis-
match is not a very important determinant of Dutch
unemployment. If mismatch between unemployment and
vacancies would be absent in the Dutch labour market, the
unemployment rate would decrease with merely 0.1 to 0.3
percentage point.
A final note concerns the cyclical pattern of the mismatch
indicator. The pattern of mismatch appears to be counter-
cyclical.^ Thus, mismatch increases during recessions and
decreases during booms. This can possibly be explained by
the dismissal behaviour of employers. If lower-educated
workers acquire less firm-specific skills than higher-
educated workers, employers may first dismiss the easier re-
placeable lower educated workers during cyclical downturns
•'Our result is, however, consistent with Gorter and van Ours (1994) using Dutch regional data over the period 1980-88 and Bianchard
and Diamond (1989) for the US labour market.
I'An empiriail analysis of some alternitlive explanations for the ri.se in Dutch unemployment can be found in Dur (1996).
"A simple regression oUnm on a trend and the capacity utilization grade yields: mm = - 0.003 trend - 0.24 iog(capucity utilization grade).
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(van Ours and Ridder. 1995).'" This creates more variation
in the unemployment rate between educational levels during
cyclical downturns, and thus increases educational mis-
match.
IV. C O N C L U S I O N S
In this paper, we analysed the importance of educational
mismatch in the Dutch labour market. Using annual unem-
ployment and vacancy data by educational level over the
period 1969-93, we estimated a matching function which
incorporates the effect of educational mismatch on the
aggregate flow of Hlled job vacancies. Using the estimated
parameters, we calculated how much of total unemploy-
ment can be attributed to educational mismatch for each
year within the considered period.
The results of our analysis indicate that educational
mismatch is not a very important determinant of the unem-
ployment rate in the Netherlands. Only 5-10% of total
unemployment can be attributed to educational mismatch.
If mismatch would be absent in the Dutch labour market,
the unemployment rate would decrease with merely 0.1 to
0.3 percentage point.
The pattern of educational mismatch shows a remarkable
trend over the considered period. Contrary to common
belief, the relative importance of edueational mismatch ap-
pears to have strongly decreased since the end of the 1960s.
Thtis, the huge rise in Dutch unemployment since Ihe end of
the 1960s cannot be accounted for by increased educational
mismatch between vacancies and unemployment.
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APPENDIX: DATA SOURCES
U ^ aggregate number of registered unemployed. Souree:
CBS, Statistiek ijeregistreerde werkluoshcid.
Vi = number of unetnployed by educational level. Souree:
CBS, Tijdreeksen arbeidsrekenimjen 1969-1993.
V = aggregate number of vacancies. Source: CPB, Centraal
Economisch Plan.
V; = number of vacancies by educational level. Source:
CBS, Tijdreeksen arbeidsrekeningen 1969-1993.
'"Some additional indirect evidence for this hypothesis can be found in Lever and van der Linden (t996). Based on estimation of labour
demand equations differentiated by educational level, they find that adjustment of demand for lower-educated workers evolves more
rapidly than demand for higher-educated labour.
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M = aggregate flow of filled vacancies. Sources; 1969-1988; L/» = share of long-term unemployed in total unemploy-
V/T,, 1989-1993: CBS. Sociaal Economische Maand- ment. Sources: 1969-1987: van Ours (1991).
statistic!:. March 1997, p. 40. \9^S-\993: CBS. Statistieki,ereciistreerde\verkioosheiii.
T,. =- average vacancy duration. Sources: 1969-1978: Har- RR = replacement rate = minimum benefit Ievel/0.8 x
tog (1980), 1979: interpolation, 1980-1987: van Ours average wagQ. Source: CPB, Centraal Ecoiumisch Plati.
(1991), 1988: interpolation, 1989-1993 calculated as Instrument variables. Sources: OECD, Economic Outiook,
VIM. and CPB, Centraal Econotnisch Plan.
L = aggregate labour force. Source: CPB, Centraal Econom-
isch Plan.

